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Abstract 
Much of contemporary Amish scholarship manifests an implicit functionalist paradigm that 
harkens back to mid-20th-century social science. This perspective tends toward optimistic, even 
“Panglossian,” explanation of traits, in which everything that the Amish do or believe has a use, 
purpose, or reason; i.e., a function. The vagaries of history and the ebb and flow of power may be 
acknowledged, but they are relegated to minor explanatory factors. This essay provides a close 
reading of Donald Kraybill’s popular The Riddle of Amish Culture. It demonstrates the 
functionalist premises behind many of the explanations offered in Riddle, despite the fact that the 
author provides sufficient information for the reader to come to different conclusions about how 
aspects of Amish life came to be what they are. That the Amish themselves read and respect 
Kraybill’s work leads to a paradoxical situation in which Kraybill’s narratives are taken to be true 
explanations, which then become another doctrine that must not be debated or self-corrected. 
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Introduction 
With few exceptions, most social scientific writings on Amish topics maintain a 
justifiably discredited theoretical paradigm associated with the mid-20th century. This 
paradigm—functionalism—is often implicit rather than explicit, and it is not always obvious 
whether any consistent or coherent version of functionalism is being employed. There is 
typically little attempt at theoretical justification or argument; rather, the authors assert functional 
“explanations” as being obvious, intuitive, scientific, and “natural.” 
We will argue in this paper that while such “explanations” do satisfy many Western, 
especially American, cultural predilections for seeing practical reason behind the actions and 
beliefs of “others,” they are frequently ahistorical and biased. They predispose us to viewing 
other people’s actions and beliefs through an optimistic, Panglossian2 lens. All or most of what 
other people do and think may be viewed as adaptive, reasonable, useful, good, inevitable—i.e., 
functional. Although historical contingencies may be acknowledged, the explanations are mostly 
rooted in what different “traits” accomplish at the level of individual psychology, social 
cohesion, ecological balance, or any number of other desirable outcomes. Consensus, social 
cohesion, and the maintenance of stasis tend to be stressed over dynamism and conflict, which 
are viewed in a negative light. 
As has been pointed out by many social scientists, such functionalist explanations tend to 
understate “life’s hard edges” and the interplay of power relations. They lead us to view the 
“other” as living in Smurf Villages rather than bubbling cauldrons of competing interests. Strong 
exercises of authority are assumed to be legitimate and affirmed by consensus rather than 
enacted by the ability to coerce subordinates despite subtle and not-so-subtle forms of resistance 
from below. To put it more starkly: functionalism often slides down the slippery slope into 
becoming an apologetics for the perspectives of the powerful, and is, in a literal sense, a 
conservative doctrine. All of these attributes are patently on display in the Amish Studies 
literature. For the purposes of this essay, we will focus on one classic example: Donald 
Kraybill’s (2001) widely read The Riddle of Amish Culture, a book that manages to be both 
popular and scholarly and that is widely read by both Amish themselves and curious English. 
Obviously, the two authors of this essay come from quite different perspectives. One of 
us (Billig) is an anthropologist who has situated himself within the neo-Weberian perspective 
that stresses keeping one’s value judgments out of one’s social science as much as is humanly 
possible (see, e.g., Billig 2003). The other (Zook) is a non-compliant, Amish-raised person who 
has spent much of the last decade as an avowed advocate on Amish issues. We disagree about 
many things despite the fact that we have a productive and warm collaboration. But on the 
question of a functionalist theoretical stance and its intended and unintended consequences, we 
are (mostly) of one mind. But just in case, the final section of this essay prior to the conclusions 
will be Zook expressing himself entirely in his own voice. 
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Riddles 
Kraybill’s Riddle of Amish Culture is a contradictory book. The first ten chapters—about 
two-thirds of the book—are highly Panglossian and functionalist, explaining virtually all of the 
“riddles” by elucidating how various “traits” add positively to social cohesion. The last four 
chapters, however, are more scholarly and balanced, often mentioning conflict, potential social 
disruptions, and the interplay of power. At times, he even expresses a less sanguine assessment of 
the Amish future. Kraybill seems not to notice the contradiction between these two parts, and he 
seems not to imagine that his readers would notice. 
The overarching trope of Kraybill’s book is, of course, riddles: aspects of Amish culture, 
society, and beliefs that seem strange or inexplicable to outsiders: “Idyllic from afar, Amish 
culture is teeming with riddles upon closer inspection. Outsiders are often baffled by the logic, or 
apparent absence of it, in Amish culture” (Kraybill 2001, 1). Riddles need to be solved, which in 
this case means to be explained rather than changed or fixed. Not only do outsiders crave the 
solutions to the riddles—frequently asking, “Why?”—but in many cases, such as the prohibition 
on bicycles but not souped-up scooters, so too do the Amish themselves (p. 2). 
To the question, “Is there a logic beneath this cultural hodgepodge—a hidden web of 
meaning that explains the confusing conundrums?” the answer is an emphatic Yes: “From behind 
the curtain, many of the puzzles appear to be ingenious solutions to the practical dilemmas faced 
by a group struggling to retain its traditional values amidst a rapidly changing world” (p. 3). Not 
only is the world rapidly changing, but also “modernization” is wreaking “cultural devastation” 
on “traditional cultures,” the Amish among them (p. 1). 
Many of the “traits” we see among the Amish may be explained as functional responses 
that preserve consensus, order, and organization and stave off the specters of worldliness and 
conflict in the face of these rapid changes. To prevent “fragmentation” and excessive 
individualism (p. 19), the “Aspirations, whims, and rights of individual members must be 
sacrificed for the common good” (p. 21). The response to the “de-contextualization” (p. 19) 
attendant to modernity is to ban photography, television, and telephones. “Defensive groups” 
(such as the Amish) must stress collective goals—“obedience, surrender, sacrifice, commitment, 
and discipline”—ahead of individual ones (p. 22).  
In a two page functionalist blizzard, limiting “God’s blessing of peace and eternal life” 
only to the “obedient,” having “decisive leadership (to) speed decision making and offer 
security,” and “having a system of social rewards and punishments … to keep members 
compliant with groups norms” (pp. 22-23) are all necessary to maintain social cohesion and 
resist the temptations of the wider world. All this is seen as being analogous to the strategies 
taken by “teams facing aggressive opponents, corporations battling stiff competition, and armies 
engaged in combat” (p. 23). Even the short section about the history of Amish schisms concludes 
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that, “In retrospect, the expulsion of dissidents served useful social functions over the years” (p. 
26). 
Although the main thrust of Riddle is to explain specific traits by their specific functions, 
the book also suggests a grand explanation for Amish culture in general. “The solution to the 
riddle of Amish culture is embedded in the German word Gelassenheit” (p. 29; boldface ours, 
italics in original). “Gelassenheit is a master cultural disposition, deeply bred into the Amish 
soul, that governs perceptions, emotions, behavior, and architecture” (p. 29; italics ours). 
For a word that is “rarely used in speech” and is “an abstract concept,” Kraybill pushes 
Gelassenheit about as far as it could go; many Amish people do not even know what the word 
means. What at first seems to be a Weberian ideal type takes on a reified existence capable of 
exerting action on people. “The submissive posture of Gelassenheit discourages higher 
education, abstract thinking, competition, professional occupations, and scientific pursuits” (p. 
31; italics ours). Gelassenheit, this active abstraction, “recycles” (“individual energy for 
community purposes…”), “regulates” (“the entire spectrum of life…”), “blends” (several traits 
together) (p. 32), and “prefers” (“small-scale things”) (p. 106).3 
One photograph of an Amish man smiling is labeled “the contented smile of 
Gelassenheit” (p. 35); another photo of four Amish men being prosecuted for refusal to send their 
children to high school states that the fathers are showing “the resignation of Gelassenheit” (p. 
42). Later, Kraybill asks, “What is the organizational shape of Gelassenheit” (p. 80). Again, this 
ideal type abstraction seemingly possesses its own volition and is being pushed to serve too 
many explanatory purposes. 
Kraybill explains acts of discipline as being acts of love. “A father spanks his child out of 
love. A bishop expels and shuns a member in ‘hopes of winning him back’” (p. 39). About the 
method of choosing clergy by “divine mandate,” he states, “It is […] an ingenious solution to 
leadership selection that in a plain and simple manner confers stability, authority, and unity to 
community life” (p. 130-31). Of course, it barely needs to be said that the sections on 
excommunication and shunning strike highly functionalist chords, viewing these practices as 
being completely essential for the preservation of order, discipline, and social control. 
Using a Durkheimian model and an old-fashioned metaphor for culture that views ritual 
as being somehow external to culture and society, Kraybill asserts: 
Religious rituals fuse culture and structure into social music. Without ritual, a group’s culture and 
structure are static—like an orchestra frozen on stage. For example, culture exists in the minds of the 
musicians; the players understand the musical notation and they know how to play their instruments. 
Structure is present on the stage as well. Arranged carefully in their proper sections, the musicians face 
the conductor. But there is no ritual, no interaction, no music until the conductor’s baton signals the 
start of the performance—the ritualized interaction. Cultural knowledge and structural architecture 
suddenly blend into music. In similar fashion, the rituals of interaction combine culture and structure 
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into a social symphony of Amish life. (p. 111; italics ours) 
The assertion that culture and structure are static without ritual is undermined on the very 
next page where Kraybill asserts, “There is one way to be baptized, one way to be married, and 
one way to be buried—the Amish way. The rigidity of the ritual eliminates any choice and makes 
the ceremonial life of the community highly predictable” (p. 112). In other words, on one page 
Kraybill views ritual as the source of cultural dynamism, while on the next page he sees it as 
leading to stasis. 
As is the case with much functionalist writing, Kraybill employs hyperbole to illustrate 
how essential certain elements are in maintaining Amish culture and structure. Nowhere is this 
truer than in the section on education. “The Amish realized that the consolidated high school, 
designed to homogenize different cultures, would also destroy them” (p. 175). “Amish parents 
realized that progressive education would fracture their traditional culture” (p. 175).  
Kraybill argues that the Amish-run one-room schools do an excellent job at preparing 
young people for life in Amish society. “Indeed, they are one of the prime reasons for the growth 
and vitality of Amish life” (p. 177). “Amish schools fare as well if not better than many public 
schools [at preparing students for life in their own society]. The vitality of Amish culture certifies 
the ability of its schools to prepare its pupils for a successful life in Amish society” (p. 181-82). 
In many places, Kraybill tells his reader that over the last several decades, the percentage of 
Amish young people who choose baptism has increased from around 50 percent to over 90 
percent. He interprets this as a sign of “vitality,” but, of course, there is an alternate explanation 
concerning education. Perhaps Amish education — so good at preparing students for Amish life 
— diminishes the choice Amish young people have by doing more poorly than it once did at 
preparing them for American life. 
Kraybill comes close to admitting as much in his section on Rumspringa. Here the 
functional explanation is more about giving people the impression of choice than it is about 
actual choice, which is a more nuanced perspective than he evinces in his other explanations of 
riddles. He asserts that the “redeeming function” of Rumspringa is to serve as a type of “social 
immunization,” in which “a minimal dose of worldliness strengthens resistance in adulthood” (p. 
186).  
A fling with worldliness gives Amish youth the impression that they have a choice regarding church 
membership […]. The evidence, however, suggests that the perceived choice is partially an illusion. 
Amish youth have been thoroughly immersed in a total ethnic world with its own language, symbols, 
and worldview […]. In many ways, Amish youth do not have a real choice because their upbringing 
and all the social forces around them funnel them toward church membership […]. Many rowdy 
youth are ‘reaped’ later by the church in the form of obedient adults who willingly comply with the 
Ordnung because they believe they had a choice. (p. 186-87) 
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Although Kraybill tells the reader about the history of the decision to ban telephones as a 
result of the 1909 schism (in which the Old Order groups banned the phone largely because the 
progressives opted to accept it), he still concludes that discussion with a functionalist explanation 
rooted in yet another “core of Amish culture”: “Although quicker and handier, the phone 
threatened to erode the core of Amish culture: face-to-face conversation. Thus, the restrictions on 
phones help to preserve separation from the outside world as well as social capital within” (p. 
193; italics ours). 
When the Amish refuse to compromise with modernity, Kraybill explains their refusal 
functionally; but he also provides functional explanations when they do compromise. Such is the 
case with the Amish taxi services. 
In forging the car deal, the Amish gave up autonomy and independence, but some benefits come with 
the compromise. By permitting the use of cars, they are able to travel to distant places and conduct 
business in a kind of door-to-door limousine service without the typical costs of purchase and 
maintenance and without driving fatigue. In this way, the Amish have retained the virtues of simplicity 
as well as the convenience of modernity. It is a way of using modern technology without being 
enslaved by it or allowing it to destroy community. The use of motor vehicles has become essential for 
the fiscal survival of Amish industries. Moreover, it also links families and friends living in other 
counties and states. 
Traveling by van also fosters community; it builds social capital (p. 220-21). 
Since decisions are functional when the Amish resist modernity and also when they 
compromise with modernity, one is tempted to ask whether the Amish are even capable of 
making dysfunctional decisions. If the compromise allowing Amish taxis added to community in 
the specified ways, was the pre-compromise stance banning the taxis dysfunctional, maladaptive, 
or wrong-headed? Certainly not in Kraybill’s explanatory universe. 
In discussing the reasons for Amish success at business, Kraybill lists many obvious 
factors: work ethic, austerity, etc. But he also includes in this list “cultural taboos on education 
and certain forms of technology” (p. 258). This was only one of several sections in which 
Kraybill asserts that the discouragement of critical thinking serves a positive and important 
function for the maintenance of Amish society, a position he would likely oppose in his role as a 
professor teaching mainstream students. 
Among Kraybill’s most astonishing functional claims concerns the potential effects of the 
rapid transition (especially in Lancaster County) to earning income more from business than 
from farming. We will later argue that this transition has great potential to make significant and 
disruptive sociocultural changes, and Kraybill acknowledges as much later in the book. But, as 
usual, early on Kraybill makes the more Panglossian prediction: 
In some ways, non-farm jobs have enhanced the vitality of community life. For example, they have 
increased Amish population density. Single-dwelling houses on small lots have greatly reduced the 
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geographical size of some church districts, which enhances face-to-face interaction. This reinforces 
the oral base and social ties of Amish culture as well as the practicality of horse-and-buggy travel 
because family and friends are nearby. With fellow Amish close together, the dialect constantly 
reaffirms the sectarian world-view and provides a buffer against modern ways. In these ways, the 
occupational changes have embellished community solidarity, replenished social capital, and fortified 
Amish identity (p. 259). 
This for a people whose lives have been predicated on agriculture for their entire existence! Even 
this most radical and unprecedented shift in Amish economic history is spun as having a positive 
function and being a cause for optimism. 
History and Power 
Although Kraybill has a fundamentally functionalist perspective, he is an honest enough 
scholar to provide most of the information necessary to reach other conclusions. His account of 
social change in the last few chapters of Riddle is (rather jarringly) more nuanced and dynamic 
than in the previous ten chapters. Whereas early in the book the theme was explaining the riddles 
of Amish culture with functional explanations, towards the end Kraybill asserts: 
No single principle or value regulates change in Amish society; it is a dynamic process, and the 
outcome is always uncertain. A variety of factors impinges [sic] on any decision to accept or reject a 
particular practice. Decisions to move symbolic boundaries always emerge out of the ebb and flow of 
a fluid social matrix. The factors shaping a particular decision vary greatly (p. 297). 
The information he provides about Amish history, especially schisms, gives the reader a 
sense of the important role that conflict and the interplay of power has had in forging Amish 
culture. Although much of the book espouses a “bishops’ eye view” of explanation, it doesn’t 
take very much reading between the lines to envision alternate explanations. 
As early as the second chapter, Kraybill states (in a section on the role of the Bible), 
“Beyond their religious worldview, social control issues also come into play. Individual 
interpretations would quickly splinter uniform beliefs and, more importantly, the authority 
structure of the entire community” (p. 37). And although he equates Amish excommunication 
with modern society’s sending people to prison, expelling illegal immigrants, and firing 
insubordinate employees (reifying a metaphor, to our tastes), he does refer to the ban as “the 
ultimate form of social control” (p. 137). Social control is an important factor in many versions 
of functionalism, but it is not for most of the first two-thirds of Riddle. What sets Kraybill apart 
from other functionalists is his insistence that all instances of social control among the Amish are 
necessary, virtuous, and positive. 
Kraybill mostly sees the post-Wisconsin v. Yoder Amish educational system in a highly 
functional (and positive) light, but he admits that allowing Amish youth to learn “rational 
thought, critical thinking, scientific method, [and] symbolic abstraction” would enable such 
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youth to “scrutinize their culture with an analytic coolness that would threaten the bishops’ 
power” (p. 176; italics ours). 
Although Kraybill mostly focuses on the “redeeming function” of Rumspringa “in the 
social system” (p. 186), he also admits that, “Amish youth do not have a real choice because 
their upbringing and all the social forces around them funnel them towards church membership” 
(p. 186), but that it is important for Amish youth to “believe they had a choice” (p. 187). 
On a number of occasions, Kraybill admits that decisions taken by Old Order bishops 
were more responses to decisions by progressive or schismatic forces than purely a matter of 
function. “The liberals had adopted the phone, and thus the Old Orders could not accept it again 
without a severe loss of face. Permitting phones would be a de facto endorsement of the 
insurgents” (p. 191). “Fearing an unholy alliance with an evil world, steering a careful course 
away from the Peachey group, and bearing the imprint of a strict bishop, the electric taboo 
became inscribed in the Ordnung in 1920” (p. 200). “The division of 1966 erupted when the 
bishops tried to eradicate several pieces of farm equipment that had been in use for ten years in 
several church districts […]. Questionable practices must be banned before they slip into 
widespread use” (p. 299). In other words, the vagaries of history and the circumstances of power 
matter as explanations of Amish norms. 
Although Kraybill generally has a rosy view of the cultural effects of the recent 
occupational changes among the Amish, he does admit that, “One thing is certain: the 
transformation of work will change every aspect of (Amish) life” (p. 259), and, “Traditional 
Amish attitudes toward work and leisure will certainly change as the exodus from the farm 
continues” (p. 261). He asserts that, “Signs of modernity—growing individualism, control, 
efficiency, rationality, mobility, and occupational specialization—are clearly more and more in 
evidence. The rise of microenterprises is, in short, transforming the traditional culture of Amish 
society” (p. 309). He states that, “The recent changes seriously threaten the historic patterns of 
equality” (p. 109), and he acknowledges that the emergence of such inequality will likely have 
profound cultural effects and alter the dynamics of power. “First, managers, immersed in the 
daily logic of the business world, may become disenchanted […]. Second, this emergent class 
represents a new, informal power structure in Amish society […]. Business knowledge and 
organizational savvy arm this new breed of Amish with a power base that, if organized, could 
pose a serious threat to the bishops’ traditional clout” (p. 264).  
The bishops are not a source of innovation; instead, their duty is to inspect impending changes and 
resist the detrimental ones. Change in Amish society typically comes not from the top or the center of 
the social system, but from the periphery. It is often instigated by those living on the edge of the 
cultural system who try to stretch the boundaries. (p. 298) 
Kraybill adds that when innovators are well-respected or wealthy people, it is more likely that 
their innovations will be accepted. In other words, successful businessmen are becoming the new 
positive reference group in many ways, and this situation may be fraught with conflict. 
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The foregoing admissions about the significant changes likely to accompany the 
changing mode of production among the Amish are plausible and sound. Although it is true that 
the Amish have weathered many storms before, their agrarian economic foundation and rural 
ways of living have been constants since their origin. Of course, none of us possesses a crystal 
ball enabling us to know the future, but such transitions have happened and are continuing to 
happen in different places for the last 250 years, so we do have a reasonable comparative record 
of the impact of commodification, the emergence of new class orders, and the shift in the 
structures of authority, that go along with such transitions. Surely, the Amish are unlike other 
societies in many important ways, but it would nonetheless be unimaginable for such a shift not 
to be accompanied by significant and disruptive social and cultural change. After reading 
Chapter 10 of Riddle, Kraybill’s prior assertion that the shift in occupational structure would add 
to social cohesion seems all the more implausible. 
Although Kraybill acknowledges that most decisions in Amish society represent dynamic 
compromises within complex historical circumstances, he does not acknowledge that such an 
admission undermines the simplistic riddles-of-culture functionalism of the first two-thirds of the 
book. 
Elam Zook, In His Own Words 
Billig ably illustrates the problems with the functionalist, Panglossian view from an 
academic perspective. My interest is to give voice to how these views affect the actual subjects. 
The most immediate issue is that Kraybill’s subjects are not an obscure tribe in the Amazon 
jungle. They not only read Kraybill’s work and take it seriously, but Kraybill’s work is the 
dominant source through which their non-Amish neighbors form their opinions of who the 
Amish are. 
There is another way in which Kraybill’s work has an outsized influence on his subjects. 
The Old Order Amish as we know them today, because of their authoritarian nature and the 
limits placed on education, have severely limited healthy critique and introspection. Kraybill’s 
work, instead of being an enlightened outside voice, actually exacerbates that isolation by 
functioning as a propaganda arm for Amish authority. Since Kraybill is the renowned authority 
on the Amish, his work not only defines the Amish to the non-Amish world, it also carries 
influence in defining the Amish to themselves. 
This is where Kraybill’s functionalist-Panglossian view becomes dangerous. If the world 
renowned authority on the Amish and ninety-five percent of their non-Amish neighbors believe 
Amish life is, to quote Billig, a “Smurf Village,” who are the Amish to disagree, especially if the 
Smurf Village narrative serves their leaders’ interests, and they’re inclined to reinforce it rather 
than object to it? Because of this dynamic, the Amish are unable to engage with and process their 
own issues. 
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This, in my opinion, is what it means to be a dying society. An example of this death is 
Kraybill’s own portrayal in which he concedes that Amish youth do not really have a choice 
regarding church membership. And nothing could prove this point more profoundly than when 
he then goes on to assert that the illusion of choice is, wait for it, “functional.” Somehow, he can 
justify that being tricked into thinking they have a choice is a good thing for young Amish 
adherents. The early Anabaptists—who believed that adult baptism signified the genuine choice 
to join the sacred community—must be spinning in their graves! 
In conclusion, the Amish need to exercise greater discernment of who their friends are. 
Those who say nice things about them don't necessarily have their best interests at heart.  
Education must not be synonymous with indoctrination if Amish life is to be viable and 
self-sustaining. 
Individual Amish people can believe whatever they want, but outsiders, particularly those 
ensconced in academia, should not have blanket immunity to function as advocates for a world 
view that stands in opposition to values in their own lives. For example, Kraybill acknowledges 
that Amish education "restricts consciousness," yet as a college professor, can't bring himself to 
raise the tiniest degree of doubt or concern whether there might be negative consequences to 
what might be more accurately described as an embrace of ignorance. 
These are legitimate issues that the field of Amish studies would do well to address in a 
manner that brings honor to the intents and purposes of education as opposed to dishonor. 
Conclusion: The Problems with Functionalism 
When one of the authors of this essay (Billig) was in college in the mid-1970s, he became 
enamored with one of the positivist, hyper-functionalist, “high modernist” theoretical 
perspectives in mid-century anthropology. This perspective, called “Cultural Materialism (CM),” 
was closely associated with Cultural Ecology and Neo-evolutionism, and many Marxists derided 
it as “vulgar materialism.” The founder of this “paradigm” (as he would call it), Marvin Harris, 
was one of Billig’s professors. Harris often referred to his ideas as demographic, technological, 
economic, environmental determinism (see, e.g., Harris, 2001, or in a more popular vein, Harris, 
1989).  
Rather than producing holistic ethnographic accounts of other people’s lives, CM was 
about explaining or “demystifying” the “riddles of culture” (sound familiar?); i.e., selecting 
seemingly bizarre or baffling, disarticulated traits among human societies (human sacrifice, 
cannibalism, dietary restrictions, belief in witches, believing that living monarchs are deities, 
etc.) and providing functional accounts that rendered these traits rational. I was dazzled by the 
logic of it all: (1) human beings—even when they act in bizarre ways or believe bizarre things—
are fundamentally rational; (2) they typically do not understand the rationality behind their own 
behaviors and beliefs, because they are mystified by culture (e.g., they believe they must perform 
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human sacrifice in order to propitiate a particularly blood-thirsty god); and, (3) I can know the 
true rationality behind their behaviors and beliefs because I possess science (e.g., they are really 
performing human sacrifice because they lack essential amino acids in their diet, if you get my 
drift). Once we understand the function of the trait (or riddle, if you will), we have explained it. 
This was pretty empowering stuff for a 19-year-old!! 
As happens with young anthropologists, this simplistic paradigm started to unravel soon 
after I began that quintessential rite of passage of my profession: field work. I went to India with 
a demystifying cultural materialist hypothesis identifying an overarching material cause of 
cultural effects and ended up concluding that I had certainly oversimplified cause and effect and 
perhaps had it entirely backwards. My pet causal factor was in reality a relatively minor 
consequence of complex historical and cultural dynamics that were not amenable to any simple, 
one-dimensional rationalist narrative. And the more I pondered my own research, the more it 
dawned on me that many CM “explanations” (including my own hypothesis) were little more 
than plausible sounding stories, the point of which was to render everything under the sun 
rational, inevitable, adaptable—in a word, functional—and then labeling these narratives 
“scientific.” 
As a graduate student, I became quite proficient at making up such stories, but seldom 
would there be any evidence to support such “explanations” of other people’s realities. This 
evidence-free explanatory mode is not just true of this one brand of functionalism; it 
characterizes all of them. 
Perhaps one could say that such high modernist theory collapsed under the weight of its 
own simplifications and positivist faith, having basked in the rosy optimistic glow of the 
American century. Although there have been some attempts in the last few decades to create neo-
functionalist perspectives, most of these have not gone very far. That said, the version of 
functionalism evinced in the first ten chapters of Riddle is a particularly simplified and 
Panglossian one. There are more sophisticated versions that try (often successfully) to avoid the 
cloying optimism and unfailing positivity of Kraybill’s version, which is handicapped by 
Kraybill’s deep-seated Romanticism about Amish life and his insistence that the Amish may be 
emulated as a kind of cure for the ills of modern life.  
While it may seem logical that one of the alternatives—a concentration on history and the 
interplay of power—leads to excessive particularism, this need not be the case, as taught by Max 
Weber. There are generalities to be made based on comparisons of similar phenomena in 
different times and different places. For example, for the last 25 years Billig’s topical focus has 
been societies experiencing transitions from domination by rural, agrarian, land owning elites to 
domination by urban, industrial, commercial, and financial elites. He wrote a book (Billig 2003) 
and many articles on Philippine sugar, a contemporary example of such a transition, and this in 
significant measure is why he is now so fascinated by the Amish in Lancaster County. Of course, 
as we stated earlier, history is unpredictable, and the Amish are an idiosyncratic example, to say 
Billig & Zook: Functionalist Problem in Kraybill’s Riddle 93 
 
the least. But to assert that the Amish would be able to undergo their current economic shift 
without experiencing radical and disruptive social and cultural change belies everything we 
know about similar transitions in many parts of the world for the last several centuries.5 
The functionalist perspective tacitly views stasis and consensus as normal conditions, 
which is why functionalists in the past have been so enamored with such terms as equilibrium, 
homeostasis, solidarity, and the “preservation of order.” Conflict has been viewed as unhealthy, 
undermining of social solidarity, and even pathological. The virtue of eliminating those who 
upset the social order or refuse to conform to social rules and norms has been a functionalist 
theme well before Kraybill. Kraybill’s position as an expert witness in the Sam Mullet / Bergholz 
case may be seen as motivated by such functionalist logic. Because Bishop Mullet behaved in 
ways that did not conform to the Ordnung and has, for that reason, been excommunicated, he 
could no longer be considered Amish. 
There is another way of viewing society, in which conflict is normative and constant—
even when the society’s own ideology understates the existence of conflict or denies its 
existence. Here, typically, society is seen as dynamic, changing, fluid, ever making new 
compromises. Whereas “consensus theory” leads to the optimistic or Panglossian view that most 
cultural traits add to order or solidarity, “conflict theory” makes no a priori judgment about 
whether society is progressing, puttering along, or going to hell in a hand basket. Scratch a bit 
under the surface of apparent stasis, and one will find conflict being managed, for the time being. 
The history of Amish schisms, especially the reactions of Amish authority to the practices of 
progressive groups, itself belies the consensus view of Amish history and society. Functional 
explanations tend toward the logical, reasonable, and orderly. But history and social life tend to 
be a lot more complex and disorderly. 
It has been pointed out by many scholars that functionalism often serves as an apologetics 
for the powerful, and is, as such, complicit in the hegemonic narrative that reproduces structures 
of power. Those who wield the most power in any society rarely explain their actions or thoughts 
as being rooted in self-interest or the preservation and aggrandizement of their power. Rather, 
they claim that their wielding of power adds to the social good—wealthy people are “job 
creators,” the ritual position and work of Brahmins is essential for the well-being of all castes, 
bishops always make decisions that preserve and defend Amish culture. Because of their focus 
on the positive virtues of various cultural traits, especially how these traits add to social 
solidarity and community harmony, functionalist explanations often jibe with those of powerful 
actors. Other explanatory paradigms tend to be far more likely to get under the surface of the 
rhetoric of power in order to understand how power operates qua power. This is what some 
social scientists refer to as attention to “life’s hard edges.” 
But Kraybill’s functionalism comes with a more problematic feature that is very different 
from the perspectives of other social scientists. Most social scientific writing is read by the 
priesthood of other social scientists, and perhaps (if one is lucky) social science students. 
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Kraybill’s work, especially Riddle, is read avidly by members of the subject community, in this 
case, the Amish. Amish who would not themselves be interested in explaining their own riddles, 
let alone casting a critical gaze upon Amish life, are mostly big fans of Kraybill, largely because 
he portrays their society and culture in positive ways that seldom challenge authority and 
received wisdom. One of us (Zook) has been an extremely outspoken critic of Kraybill’s shaping 
of the Amish perspective on their history and culture rather than being a fair-minded analyst of 
Amish life from multiple perspectives. It is as though Kraybill has conflated the legal roles of 
expert witness and advocate, which would not be allowed in a court of law. One may hear echoes 
of Kraybill whenever one engages an Amish person on such topics as the forgiveness narrative, 
shunning, education, and the Mullet incident. 
In addition to satisfying Amish preferences in explaining their lives, there is much about 
this brand of functionalism that is deeply embedded in wider American cultural predilections. 
Americans like orderly, rational, plausible sounding explanations for social phenomena rather 
than references to the vagaries and caprices of history. Determinism suits us better that 
contingency and probability.6 Certainly, we love to think that the highly romanticized Amish do 
have an underlying rationality to their seemingly inscrutable ways of life. When Billig’s family 
and out-of-town friends come to visit Lancaster, they frequently ask questions about the Amish 
that begin with, “Why do they…?” or “Why won’t they… ?” Historical answers don’t seem to 
satisfy them as much as functional ones. Reflecting back on that 19-year-old dazzled by the 
prospect of a new explanatory science of humanity, I can relate to our cultural biases about what 
does and does not constitute adequate explanations. And, I must admit, when I first read 
Kraybill’s Riddle many years ago, I, too, found his explanations deeply satisfying. 
Donald Kraybill is popular because he is a fine writer and good scholar who touches the 
right buttons both for the Amish and for American moderns. But we suspect that many of his 
explanations are overly facile, out of historical context, and, maybe at times, even dangerous. 
Endnotes 
1 Contact information: Michael S. Billig, Professor and Chair, Department of Anthropology, 
Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604; mbillig@fandm.edu. Elam Zook, 
Independent Consultant, Department of Anthropology, Franklin & Marshall College. 421 Nevin 
St., Lancaster, PA 17603; ezook421@gmail.com 
2 This adjective derives from the character Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide: Or Optimism. 
Pangloss is a philosopher who is a parody of Leibnitz and the entire rationalist school of 
Enlightenment thought. No matter what tragedies befall the characters of the book and the world, 
Pangloss asserts that things could not be otherwise, because we live in the “best of all possible 
worlds,” which, in Voltaire’s view, is a bankrupt philosophy of stasis and inaction. The name 
“Pangloss” means “all words.” 
3 Treating an abstraction or metaphor as a thing of nature capable of exerting action is the classic 
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philosophic error of reification, sometimes called the error of misplaced concreteness. 
4 Note the language suggesting the fragility, even tenuousness, of Amish culture. 
5 The argument that the Amish will manage to adapt to this transition without radical changes is 
more fully made in Kraybill and Nolt (2004). 
6 When Billig was seriously ill 19 years ago, he was surprised at how many people tried to 
comfort him by saying that “everything happens for a reason.” This provided no comfort 
whatsoever. I just smiled awkwardly and said nothing instead of responding, “Thank you, Dr. 
Pangloss.” 
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